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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Courts-Martial-Right to Counsel-An accused
before a military court is not entitled under the sixth amendment to be
represented by legally trained counsel.
Kennedy v. Commandant, 258 F. Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966).
Petitioner was convicted in two seperate special courts-martial each re-
sulting in confinement for six months and forfeiture of pay. Before his
second trial petitioner objected to being deprived of the benefit of a quali-
fied lawyer. He requested that a qualified military lawyer be appointed
to defend him or that a qualified civilian lawyer be hired at government
expense.' An affidavit of indigency was submitted with this request.2
Having exhausted military appellate review petitioner filed for a writ of
habeas corpus.'
In dismissing the petition, the Federal District Court for the District
of Kansas held that "an accused before a military court is not entitled
as a matter of right under the Sixth Amendment to representation by
1. Neither defense counsel nor trial counsel (the prosecutor) were "legally" trained.
Since these were special courts-martial the requirements of the UNIFORM CODE OP MmrrARY
JUSTICE (hereinafter cited as UCMJ). UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964) provides in
part:
(b) Trial counsel or defense counsel detailed for a general court-martial-
(1) must be a judge advocate of the Army or the Air Force, or a law specialist
of the Navy or Coast Guard, who is a graduate of an accredited law school or
is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a State;
or must be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a
State; and
(2) must be certified as competent to perform such duties by the Judge Advo-
cate General of the armed force of which he is a member.
(c) In the case of a special court-martial-
(1) if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-
martial, the defense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be a
person similarly qualified; and
(2) if the trial counsel is a judge advocate, or a law specialist, or a member of
the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the defense counsel
detailed by the convening authority must be one of the foregoing.
Apparently, this difference in the qualification of counsel for general and special courts-
martial is due to the fact that the punishments which may be prescribed by a special court-
martial are limited, although they may be harsh. See UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
2. If this were submitted in the federal civilian courts the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1964) would have been met. Generally, on the right to counsel of the indigent
defendant see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. For some of the problems presented in the scope of review of military proceeding by
federal courts through habeas corpus proceedings see notes 14-15, infra, and materials cited
therein. However, the court in Kennedy does not discuss this problem and dismissed the
petition for the reasons discussed.
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legally trained counsel"4 and that any such right is dependent upon the
action of Congress pursuant to Article I Section 8 of the Constitution.5
The court states that the question presented has been answered and refers
to the language in various opinions which illustrate the seperate develop-
ment of the military system of justice and that the safeguards of the
Constitution were not meant to apply to military proceedings.'
However, an examination of the authority so relied upon by the court
only serves to illustrate that the question has not, as yet, been answered
and the "authority" used by the court might very well support a holding
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does apply to military courts.
One of the statements relied upon by the court is that of Justice Black
in Reid v. Covert:7
Article I, § 8, cl. 14 empowers Congress "To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
It has been held that this creates an exception to the normal
method by trial in civilian courts as provided by the Consti-
tution and permits Congress to authorize military trial of mem-
bers of the armed forces without all the safeguards given an
accused by Article III and the Bill of Rights. [Footnote omit-
ted.] 8
This statement, of itself, might be taken to mean that Congress decides
what rights are to be afforded servicemen in the military courts. How-
ever, Justice Black also states: "As yet it has not been clearly settled
to what extent the Bill of Rights and other protective parts of the Consti-
tution apply to military trials."9 This suggests that, in fact, at least some
of the protections found in the Bill of Rights extend to an accused before
a military court and this is not merely dependent upon the action of
Congress pursuant to its Article I powers.10
4. 258 F. Supp. at 970.
5. Congress is empowered "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6. For an historical analysis of the question see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1957) wherein the author
concludes that, with the exception of the jury provisions of the fifth and sixth amendments,
the Bill of Rights was meant of apply to courts-martial. Id. at 321. But see also Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice (pts. I-I1), 72 HARV. L. REv. 1,
266 (1958) wherein it is concluded that the original intent was "that the servicemen's rights
are statutory rather than constitutional." Id. at 294.
7. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
8. Id. at 19, quoted in 258 F. Supp. at 969.
9. Id. at 37.
10. The Court of Military Appeals has stated: "the protections in the Bill of Rights,
except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to
members of our armed forces." United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29
C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960). Of course, many of the safeguards found in the Constitution are
expressly extended to an accused before a military court by the UCMJ, e.g., UCMJ art. 31,
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Also relied upon by the court in support of its view is the statement
by Chief Justice Vinson in Burns v. Wilson:"
Miltary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists
separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal
judicial establishment. This Court has played no role in its de-
velopment, we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts
which enforce it; the rights of men in the armed forces must
perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies
which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this
adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Con-
gress. [Footnotes omitted.] 12
However, it is also stated, but not noted by the district court,
that:
The military courts, like the state courts, have the same
responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from
a violation of his constitutional rights. In military habeas corpus
cases, it would be in disregard of the statutory scheme if the
federal civil courts failed to take account of the prior proceeding
-of the fair determination of the military tribunals after all
military remedies have been exhausted.'
This latter statement limits the statement referred to by the district court
and suggests that in establishing the military courts Congress may do so
only in such a manner as will not hinder the constitutional rights of the
accused. 4 Moreover, although a very limited scope of review is suggested
10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964) (compulsory self-incrimination prohibited; UCMJ art. 55, 10 U.S.C.
§ 855 (1964) (cruel and unusual punishment).
11. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
12. Id. at 140, quoted in 258 F. Supp. at 969. The court also states that Chief Justice
Vinson was speaking for the Court. However, the validity of Burns v. Wilson as precedent
has been questioned on the basis that there was no opinion of the Court. Wiener, supra
note 6, at 297, nn. 554-55 and accompanying text.
13. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
14. This raises the issue of which court has the function of declaring portions of the
UCMJ unconstitutional if Congress is subject to such limitation. UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C.
§ 876 (1964) provides that the appellate review provided for is "final" and "binding." Chief
Justice Earl Warren in the Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1962),
refers to the Court of Military appeals "as a sort of civilian 'Supreme Court' of the Military."
Id. at 188. He also discusses the import of Burns v. Wilson and, while conceding that there
is, at least, some regulatory role to be played by the federal judiciary, seems to suggest that
with the advent of the Court of Military Appeals any such regulatory role is unnecessary.
Id. at 188-89.
One student submits that the Court of Military Appeals can not invalidate an act of
Congress. Comment, The Constitutional Rights of Servicemen before Courts-Martial, 64
CoLtrm. L. Rav. 127, 147-48 (1964). Perhaps through habeas corpus proceedings the Supreme
1966-1967]
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in Burns v. Wilson, the federal courts may exercise some "supervisory"
power over the military court, at least, to the extent of determining the
fairness of the military proceedings.' 5
However, neither of the above statements consider the specific question
of an accused's right to legally trained counsel in special courts-martial
but discuss only the general applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
military. If Justice Black's statement from Reid v. Covert is the more
correct one, i.e., it is not settled to what extent the Bill of Rights does
apply, it is still possible that the Sixth Amendment right to legally trained
counsel does not apply.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider that authority cited by the court
as dealing with the particular problem presented. Here, the opinion of
Judge Kilday in United States v. Culp" is relied upon. Using an historical
analysis it is therein concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not apply to servicemen at courts-martial." But, the remaining
judges on the Court of Military Appeals also filed opinions and, although
concurring in the result, concluded that the right to counsel does extend
to servicemen.' One judge was of the opinion that such right does apply
but, because of military exigencies, the constitutional mandate is satisfied
by nonprofessional counsel.' 9 The other judge took the view that the
defendant had waived his right by accepting the non-professional counsel
provided. Thus it can be seen that a majority of the Court of Military Ap-
peals agrees that the right to counsel does apply to servicemen although
one of the judges does concede that, constitutionally, nonprofessional
counsel may suffice, at least as to special courts-martial." Therefore, al-
though it is probable that the result would be the same, the general tenor
of United States v. Culp is flatly at odds with the holding of the district
court.
It is for these reasons that the holding of the court is criticized. It de-
nies the applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to service-
men and the general language of the opinion suggests that none of the
Court may determine the constitutionality of the UCMJ under the "due process" require-
ments. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953). But otherwise, judgments of the
Court of Military Appeals are "final" and "binding."
15. Generally, see Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of
Court-Martial Convictions, 61 CoLus . L. Rv. 40 (1961). The author discusses the develop-
ment of the law in this area and concludes that the "best guarantee of fundamental fairness
in military trials ... is the existence of a power, wholly independent of the military organiza-
tion, to enforce such fairness." Id. at 70.
16. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963), cited in 258 F. Supp. at 969.
17. United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 204-16, 33 C.M.R. 411, 412-28 (1963).
18. Id. at 217-21, 33 CM.R. at 428-33.
19. Id. at 217-218, 33 C-M.R. at 428-430.
20. Id. at 218-21, 33 C.M.R. at 430-33.
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protections of the Bill of Rights apply, except those expressly granted by
Congress.2 ' This is objectionable because, although as the court points
out, Congress, in enacting the UCMJ, "did not lose sight of the funda-
mental rights of military defendants"2 2 ; nonetheless, it suggests that
Congress may "validly" lose sight of these rights. 3
Moreover, the holding fails to recognize that even though only special
courts-martial were involved2 4 there are circumstances under which the
right to legally trained counsel should apply. For example, in Application
of Stapley25 it was held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did
apply, although it was conceded that "military exigency may to an extent
condition that right."26 Moreover, the defendant was entitled to qualified
counsel because of the particular circumstances which involved de-
fendant's financial inability to hire a civilian lawyer,2 7 substantial and
serious charges,2" and particularly unqualified defense counsel.29 But
under the holding of the court in Kennedy, such circumstances would not
be recognized unless Congress were to so provide.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to argue whether an accused
before a special court-martial has an absolute right to legally trained
21. In 258 F. Supp. at 970 the court also quotes United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74,
77, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951): "For our purposes, and in keeping with the principles of military
justice developed over the years, we do not bottom those rights and privileges on the Consti-
tution. We base them on the laws as enacted by Congress." However, Chief Judge Quinn of
the Military Court of Appeals disagrees with this and although stating that military due
process is "different" from federal due process also states "that military due process begins
with the basic rights and privileges defined in the federal constitution." Quinn, The United
States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 225, 232.
22. 258 F. Supp. at 270.
23. Judge Kilday in United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963)
states that it will be the function of the Military Court of Appeals to decide whether an
accused was denied military due process in the unlikely event Congress were to diminish the
protections extended by the UCMJ." Id. at 216, 33 C.M.R. 428. Even assuming the court
may properly do so (see note 14 supra), this would seem to deny that "Military Due Pro-
cess" is not bottomed on the Constitution.
24. Maximum confinement under special courts-martial is six months. UCMJ art. 19,
10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
25. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
26. Id. at 320.
27. When the question of applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
previously raised before the District Court of the District of Kansas in LeBallister v. Warden,
247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965), although the holding was basically the same as in Kennedy,
the court at least distinguished Stapley from LeBallister on the basis that the defendant was
not indigent. Id. at 352. This remotely suggested that the court might consider applying the
Sixth Amendment in particular circumstances. But the holding of Kennedy has removed even
this remote possibility.
28. Some of the charges were felonies in a civil court and all involved moral turpitude.
29. Defense counsel's total training in military law was accomplished in about two days.
Assistant defense counsel had some training but no experience.
1966-1967]
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counsel," it is submitted that the facts present in Stapley make it evident
that there are at least some situations where such right does apply and
that the holding of Kennedy completely fails to recognize that these can
exist." Such a position is untenable particularly where the "authority"
relied upon by the district court in Kennedy does not clearly support the
court's view. In concluding it might also be pertinent to note that the
point raised here is largely academic in that it is doubtful that the Su-
preme Court will ever consider the question. This is because, as noted, the
maximum sentence which a special court-martial may dispense is six
months. Therefore, even assuming a situation where there were three or
four consecutive sentences as a result of as many convictions, in all prob-
ability the prisoner would be released by the time such issue would even
be before the Supreme Court, and therefore, a writ of habeas corpus would
no longer be a proper remedy. 2 Thus, in the absence of extreme cir-
cumstances any uniform relief in this area would have to come from Con-
gress. 8
Richard S. Dorfzavn
30. The presentation of such arguments may be found in more extensive student work,
e.g., Comment, The Right to Counsel in Special Courts-Martial, 50 MzN. L. REv. 147 (1965).
Therein it is argued that nonlawyer counsel are incompetent and that the use of nonlawyer
counsel results in denial of the effective assistance of counsel.
31. Except for the indigency of the petitioner and the qualification of counsel, the court
does not discuss the circumstances surrounding the courts-martial. While Stapley is cited, no
attempt is made to distinguish it. See note 27 supra.
32. There are other possibilities of collateral review. It is possible that a suit for back
pay may be brought in the Court of Claims on the theory that the defendant was unjustly
convicted of an offense against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (1964) See, e.g., Shapiro
v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947) wherein the court held that a
denial of the plaintiff's constitutional rights operated to deprive the court-martial of its
jurisdiction and vested the Court of Claims with the power to grant relief by way of a
money judgment if the serviceman had been removed from the service by the sentence oj the
court-martial. The holding obviously supports the view that the Bill of Rights does apply to
servicemen. However, such remedy would not be available to the petitioner in Kennedy
because sentencing did not result in dismissal from the service.
33. Thus, from a practical aspect, the district court is to an extent correct in that the
rights of the servicemen do, in a situation such as this, spring from the acts of Congress. But
this is not because it should properly do so but rather because of the way in which the system
operates.
At present, there is a bill to broaden the protections extended to servicemen through
amendment of the UCMJ. H.R. 226, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. (1967). The bill was submitted to
the Committee on Armed Forces and it is, at best, conjecture whether one of the proposed
amendments will be that an accused before a special court-martial has a right to be repre-
sented by legally trained counsel.
It might finally be noted that the petitioner was released from confinement and placed
under the restraint of a suspended sentence for three months. Copy of the order of the
Secretary of the Army dated February 3, 1967.
This is, in effect, the 'happy ending' that might be desired but a more liberal holding by
the court or appropriate action by Congress would insure a greater number of such endings.
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